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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
At first blush it would seem that the court went a trifle too far; that
the directors had acted for the corporation as its general agent to
proceed to conduct the business contemplated, and as such agent the
directors endorsed the notes, all for the benefit of the corporation,
thus creating a liability for any act done within the scope of his power.
There is no question but that had the corporation been successful, the
stockholders would not object to dividends or profits. But (following
the court's reasoning) the directors, (the plaintiffs) knew or at least
should have known that the corporation was not legally organized.
They knew or should have known that by doing business in its corporate
name and holding it out as legally organized, they in effect repre-
sented that it was such a corporation. They cannot, therefore, now as
against their fellow stockholders, retrace their steps and claim that
the corporation with and for whom they have dealt for so many years
never had a legal existence and so compel their fellow stockholders
to share a liability which they voluntarily assumed.
This precise question has no case exactly parallel in Wisconsin, but
has arisen generally over the country. In Georgia2 and Texas,' the
shareholders are held not liable; likewise in Illinois, 4 Louisiana- and
Planters & M. Bank v. Padgett, 69 Ga. 159.
Maine.6 There are many decisions to the contrary, Missouri being
one of the leading ones, holding that the members of the corporation
are liable to contribute their share to the managing members who have
made themselves personally liable.' The great weight of authority,
as well as the better reason, however, is the other way. The doctrine
of partnership liability in such cases is not found in law or reason and
is repugnant to the statute authorizing a corporation, one object of
which is to limit liability of stockholders.8
S. G. SKOLNIK
Dedication: Nature and requisites; common law or implied dedi-
cation.
Dugan v. Zurinuchlen' is an action to enjoin the maintenance of a
fence by defendant on the center line of an alleged sixteen-foot alley
arising either by implied dedication or by prescription. Defendant is
the owner of a subdivision which bounds the west side of the alley.
The original owners on the east side made a dedication of sixteen-
foot alley therein conveying eight feet of their land making up the
east half of the alleged alley. The original owner of defendant's land
never joined in the dedication of the west half of eight feet but
nevertheless built a fence which allowed eight feet to the alley. The
subsequent owner of the defendant's land subdivided it, and on the
plot made no reference to the alley. Now defendant removed the
'American Sale Co. v. Heidenheinzer, 8o Tex. 344.
, Cresswell & Oberly, 17 Ill. App. 281.
Pochel v. Kemper, 14 Louisana 308.
'McClinch v. Sturgis, 72 Me. 288.
'Richardson & Pitts, 7, Mo. 128.
'Gartside Coal Co, v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. Rep. 197.
1 2H N.W. 986, Ia.
NOTES AND COMMENT
old fence and built a fence along the center line of the alleged alley,
which borders the original eight feet conveyed by the east owners and
being the east half of the alley. The alley has not been used by the
public at large and the use was with the consent of the west owners
originally.
The court spends a goodly portion of the opinion in differentiating
between statutory dedication and common law dedication, and rights
by prescription and common law dedication.
The real distinction between statutory law dedication and common
law dedication is that the former requires that there be a grantee in
esse at the time of the dedication to make an acceptance.
The former operates by grant and the latter by estoppel in pais,
and whereas the former conveys the fee the latter merely conveys an
easement. No writing or conveyance is required in either case and
the statute of. frauds does not apply, but there must be an unequivo-
cal intention to dedicate; yet, long acquiescence in public use, coupled
with acts and declarations by the grantor are sufficient.
The essential difference between common law dedication and a right
acquired by prescription is that the latter is acquired by open and
claimed adverse use for the statutory period whereas the former re-
quires no such statutory period and operates by the very consent of
the owner.
In this case there was no unequivocal intention to dedicate and
the original use being by consent, the presumption is that the contin-
ued used was by consent of the owner. There being no adverse use
or dedication, there is no easement acquired by prescription or com-
mon law dedication.
BERT BERKWICH
-Master and Servant; Liability of Principal Contractors as "third
parties" under Workman's Compensation Act.
Cermak v. Milwaukee Air Power Pump Co.1 In this case the
plaintiff was employed by the Universal Construction Company who
was a sub-contractor to the defendant Pump Company. During the
course of the plaintiff's employment he was injured. Both companies
were under the Workman's Compensation Act of Wisconsin. The
plaintiff collected compensation from the Universal Construction Com-
pany and now brings an action in tort against the defendant for injury
sustained as a result of the said defendant's negligence. The de-
fendant pleaded the act as the exclusive remedy to which a demurrer
was interposed. The lower court sustained the demurrer and the Su-
preme Court affirmed the ruling.
IThe theory of the Workman's Compensation Act is based on the
idea of quick and sure remuneration to an injured employee. The act
provides for a uniform system of compensation, a speedy payment
and a guaranty of funds. In giving this advantage to the employee
he loses, however, some of his common law rights as against the em-
ployer for the remedy against the employer announced in the act
is exclusive.
1211 N.W. 354, -Wis.-
